Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1970

John W. Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Service, Inc.
: Respondent's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Jodeph J. Palmer; Attorney for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Christensen v. Lelis Automatic transmission Service, No. 11847 (1970).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4933

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

,I

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOHN W. CHRISTENSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-v:,;. LELIS AUTOMATIC
TRANSMISSION SERVICE, INC.,·
Defendant-Responde[;

Case No.
11847

I LED

Appeal from Judgment of the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County
Honorable Emmett Brown, District Judge
,Joseph J. Pahner of
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
Seventh Floor
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
.Attorneys for

J. Lambert Gibson
174 East 8th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOHN W. CHRISTENSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

- vs. -

Case No.
11847

LELIS AUTO:MATIC

TRANSMISSION SERVICE, INC.,
Defendnnt-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
f.\TATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff elaims defendant breached its warranty.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
'rhe Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Emmett Brown, dismissed
the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
f!•]ipf ran hP grantPd against de-f Pndant.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent prays the judgment be affinne<l.

2
FAC'l'N
Defondant's hlrniness is repairing and rehnildina
•''
tomobile transmissions. Plaintiff rrad defendant's nt
pap<>r ads ( R-G) antl on Fehrnary 17, 1966, wl1en 1
1959 Lincoln devdoped transmission trouble, he k
defendant tow it in for r0pair. 'The complaint s1wi
cally alleges that prior to thP commencenwnt of i
work, plaintiff inquired and was told as to the 0x111'1
invoked for a 100 percent g11aranteed tnmsrnission
placement (R-2, para. G). 'rh<'n·11von, plaintiff
the work onler (R-7). lrnnwtliat(·l:· helow tlH• :-;ignat
line in large bold print are the ·words "guarantee,
reverse side . . . . " The written guarantee is in fact,
the reverst> side of the work onler ( R-3) arnl
at R-9 in the reeord. lt providt>s:

"A. This transmission is guarantrf'<l for
months or 12,000 miles whichever
fit·
snhject to the following provisions:
I. This tramm1ission guaranteed t11
f ITe from def (•cts as to workrnanship :i
11rnterials and to gin satisfactory s!'rvicd
a period of 180 days or G,000 miles, whiche1
occn rs first.

:2. ,\n a<l<litio1rnl JS() tla:·s or ti,OOU1
gnarank<' iwriod shall i·<·11u1in in effeet 1:
eost of (if"i'ic to tlw
of pre1·:H11
11

1

· pnc('
·
·
rPtaII
on r<']Hlll"S
01· rep \ aer11 1e11t ·,]tot:

this
lwconw defocti\'r nfterl
period cow•rpd in provii,.:ion one.

3

:3. upon expiration of guarantee period
an additional warranty of 12,000 miles is in
effect to original purchaser. This warranty
good only at our plant. Cost to be based at
75% of prevailing retail prices on repairs
or r0plac0ment. .
"lt is <'xpressly agreed that there are no
guarantP<'S or warranties expressed or implied
PXCPpt this guarantee and warranty against defective materials or ·workmanship as follows: ...
Exceptions: This Certificate must be filled out
completPly and all rechecks made as prescribed
or Gnarante<> lwcomes void."

The repair work was completed and on February 24,
196G, defendant accepted plaintiff's note in payment
tlwrefor including tlH' towing charge (R-3, 8). Prior to
lea\'ing, plaintiff asked for a certificate of the guarantee.
ft was explained to him, completed ("plaintiff further
pressed for full execution of said guarantee") and the
parties each executed thl' written guarantee on the back
of th<· rrpair ord<>r (R-3).
months later, after traveling 11,583 miles,
the automobile was i·etunred with transmission trouble.
Though the written warranty signed and agreed to by
plaintiff providPs that he is to pay G5 percent of the
repair lJrice in the last 6,000 miles of the 12,000 mile
guarantee period, the complaint does not allege plaintiff
offou·rl to pay his portion of the r<>pairs and plaintiff
claims thP transmi8sion should be
repaired at
<li,['<·ndant\ PXpen;;e (R-4, Brief page 3).

4

'raking all facts in the complaint as true, Ute t
trict Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss:
complaint for failure to state a claim, subjee.t to pil
tiff's amending thf> complaint in 10 days. Plain·
declined to amend and took this appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENTS WERE '.
INDEFINITE AND INCOMPLETE TO BE, AND WERE!
INTENDED TO BE, OFFERS.

Plaintiff claims defendant's newspaper adver!
ments required defendant to guarantee its transmisi1
forever against all contingencies and risks.
The authorities are replete that newspaper adlc
tisements usually are invitations for fnilnue offersc
negotiations and are not intended as fixed expn•fi
of purpose. See nnmerons cases cited in 17 Am .Tm.
Contracts, Section 33. Thns, Comment a to Section
of the Restatement of Co11tracts proyides:
.. BP:.;ides any <lin·ct language indica.tin1
intent to defer the formation of a contract
definiteness or indefiniteness of the words
in opening the nPgotiation must be considen
as well as the usages of business and indeeJ:
accompanying circumstances. Illustrations:

5
·•1. A., a clothing merchant, advertises overc-0ats of a certain kind for sale at $50.00. This
is not an offer, but an invitation to the public to
come and purcha8e.

"2. A write to B, 'I can quote you flour at
$5.00 a barrel in carload lots.' This is not an offer.
The word 'quote' and the incompleteness of the
terms indicate that the writer is simply nam.ing
a cnrrrnt price which he is demanding."
OlJviously, newspaper advertisements conld constilitte an off er, if completf' and so intended, as plaintiff
argnes, bnt ht•re the ads are clearly invitations for fnr-

t11er dealing. The ads do not say how long the guarantee
runs, against what risks or contingencies it applies,
where the guarantee will be made good, and in the case
of "free towing," whether it applies before or in advance
of repairs and whether it applies to rebuilt transmissions
at all. (The ad in which free towing appears pertains
to band and custom linkage adjustment). The most important term, price, is left for negotiation and the ads
specifically invite further inquiry and dealing when they
say "::;et price quotation." The words "we can't be
beat on guarantee" certainly denote some limitation on
guarante€.

That plaintiff himself did not treat the ads as a
binding offer but as an invitation for further dealt: ings is shown by the complaint itRelf. In paragraph 6
plaintiff pleads "prior to the commencement of any

6
"-ork ... , plaintiff inquirc>d aR to the ex1wnse inroh,
.... " In paragraph 10 1ilaintiff plt>ads he "rt'l(llf·'ti
CertificatP of guarantee for the transmission •... " r.n

the ads lwPn complete offers in thPmselves, plairn1
conld
say "T acc<'pt." No fnrth<'r pric<• qnotan
nor reduction of the gnarant<·t> to a writtt>n certrfa;
wonld havt> lwen n<'('Pssary or lWpwstf'd hy plaintiff
"Thik• vlaintiff was <,ntitlt>d to and did rPcriw:
percent labor and lJarts t,'lUlrantPf' during tltP
l),1
miles, his claim that the 100 percent guarant!:'e continL
forever by virtue of the advertiRemt>nts obviously L
as a matter of law and under the facts stah·d in'
Complaint.
POINT II.
THE WRITTEN WARRANTY, BY ITS TERMS, N
GRATED THE PRIOR DEALINGS INTO THE AGREEME'
AND A VOIDS ALL PRIOR CONFLICTING ORAL STAi
MENTS.

By the allegations of tlw complaint, paragraphf
and 11, tlw parties Pa<'h snhscribt>d to the warrar
(R-9), "as plaintiff JffPSSPd for full t>xecution." It
there are no other guarantet>s or warrantiPs Pxpr1''''
or implit>d. Plaintiff's claim that lw is rntitled to
t}w writtPn o,000 mili•
•
IJercrnt h<rnarantf'P bPYOnd
percent guarantf'(' contra v<>n<'s tlw wri tkn contruct:
is harred hy tht> parot evidPnce rnle.
S(•dions
Brsfofl'mrut of ('011fn1rfs.

;

7
POINT III.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO FREE TOWING.

l'laintiff 's claim on appE•al seems to indicate his complaint is that he did not receive free towing. Below,
plaintiff complained only that defendant would not repair the transmission after 11,583 miles at its sole expense and demand was made for $430.08 cost of the
repairs (includes interest on the note) and general and
r:,rrnplary damages.

Fnrtlwr, the facts pleadf'd shm\' plaintiff did not
complain ahout the• chargt1 for towing when he paid the
original bill, including the repair rosts in February
1966 (R-3). Any claim with respect to the $6.00 towing
rharge would lw for retnrn of the funds voluntarily
paid. However, it is the universally held rule that money
paid under claim of right to the payment,
and with full knowledge of the facts by the person making payment, cannot he recovered back on the ground
!here was no liability to pay in the first instanee (in
tl1e ahsrnce of fraud, duress or coercion, which are not
pleaded here with particularity or at all). 40 Am Jur,
Section 157; 70 C..J.S., Payment, Section 133;
Ilrrlorn11rl 1'. Petty niotor Co., 121 rtah 370, 242 P.2d 302.
(l!JG2)

CONCLFRTON
1:'.·

1'11e new8paper ads here were intended and treated
Uw partiPs a:-; mere invitations for further dealing

s
rather than specific offers to plaintiff, as shown by t\:,
indefinite, incomplete terms and hy the conduct of pla
tiff when he· further inquired about tlw prieP
for a specific written gauaranty. A specific wn\i
warranty was given plaintiff at his special rrqueit ii'.
insistance and agreed to hy him as shown by
.'ig
tnre thereon. Tlw written warranty requires plain1,
to pay G5 percent of the costs of repairs to the tran'H1:·
sion in the second 6,000 milt-s aftPr its installation. P!31
tiff refused to pay that. He therefore has not jJlPR1i1
a breach of the contract by defendant and the Dist11,
Court properly dismissed the action for failurP of 1
complaint to state a claim. The judgment should·
1•

1

affirmed.
Respectfully suhmitted,
.Joseph J. Palmer for

WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN"
Seventh
Continental Bank Building
Salt
City, Utah

Attorneys for Rcspondciil

